Aurangzeb’s Deccan Policy and Conflicts with the Marathas

At a Glance

• Phase 1 1658 to 1668
• Phase 2 1668 to 1684
• Fall of Bijapur 1686; Golconda 1687
• Sambhaji Executed in 1689
• Death Aurangabad, 1707
• Exam link UPSC Prelims, Medieval History: Mughal Period

Where Does It Fit?

This is the thirtieth topic of the category on the Mughal period. The previous topic described Shivaji’s dealings with the Mughals, and this topic continues the story under Aurangzeb to his death. The next topic examines his religious policies. Previous topic: Treaty of Purandar (1665) and Shivaji’s Visit to Agra.

What Were the Phases of Aurangzeb’s Deccan Policy?

In short: Aurangzeb first tried to squeeze Bijapur and Golconda, then to use them against the Marathas, and finally to conquer them.

The treaty of 1636 and the promise that the Mughals would never conquer Bijapur and Golconda had been abandoned by Shah Jahan himself. In 1657 to 1658 Golconda had to pay a huge indemnity and Bijapur had to surrender the Nizam Shahi territories granted in 1636, on the ground that their Karnataka conquests were possible by Mughal benevolent neutrality. In reality the Mughal armies were expensive and the Deccan income did not cover them; subsidies came from Malwa and Gujarat. This destroyed confidence in Mughal treaties and made a union of hearts against the Marathas impossible. The earlier background is in Mughal Conquest of the Deccan Sultanates (Ahmadnagar, Bijapur, Golconda).

What Happened in the First and Second Phases?

Aurangzeb secured Kalyani and Bidar in 1657, Parenda by bribe in 1660, and Sholapur by bribery in 1668. Raja Jai Singh, the only Mughal politician advocating an all-out forward policy, argued that the conquest of Bijapur was the preface to conquest of the whole Deccan, but Aurangzeb shrank from it for reasons that can only be guessed: Iran’s threatening attitude, the length of the campaign and Shah Jahan being alive. Jai Singh’s 1665 campaign failed because the Qutb Shah sent a large force, the Deccanis used guerrilla tactics and devastated the countryside, and Jai Singh had no siege guns. Jai Singh died in 1667.

Between 1668 and 1676 the Mughals marked time. Madanna and Akkanna virtually ruled Golconda from 1672 till its extinction in 1687 and tried to build an alliance of Golconda, Bijapur and Shivaji. Aurangzeb backed a party at Bijapur that would cooperate with the Mughals, but Bijapur factions were unreliable. Diler Khan’s attempt on Bijapur in 1679 to 1680 failed against the united Deccanis, including 30,000 matchlock-armed Karnataki foot soldiers sent by Prem Naik, and Shivaji’s raids.

How Were Bijapur and Golconda Conquered?

The sins charged to the Qutb Shah included giving power to Madanna and Akhanna, helping Shivaji, and sending 40,000 men to aid Bijapur against warnings.

What Happened in the Last Phase?

In 1689 Sambhaji was surprised at Sangameshwar, paraded before Aurangzeb and executed as a rebel and infidel. This was a major political mistake: it threw away a chance to settle with the Marathas and gave them a cause. Without a single rallying point, Maratha sardars plundered Mughal areas, vanishing at the approach of the army and rallying again. Rajaram, Sambhaji’s brother, was crowned but escaped to Jinji on the east coast, spreading resistance from west to east. Aurangzeb rejected advice to return north and imprisoned Shah Alam for negotiating with the Deccani rulers. He focused on annexing Karnataka but over-extended his communications, which became vulnerable to Maratha attacks, and failed to provide sound administration in Bijapur. From 1690 to 1703 he refused to negotiate. Jinji fell in 1698 but Rajaram escaped and returned to Satara. For five and a half years from 1700 to 1705 Aurangzeb, ailing, moved from one fort siege to another while floods, disease and roving Maratha bands took a heavy toll, demoralising nobles and prompting jagirdars to make pacts to pay chauth. In 1703 he opened talks and was ready to release Shahu, Sambhaji’s son, who had been well treated, granting Shivaji’s swarajya and sardeshmukhi over the Deccan, and over 70 Maratha sardars gathered, but he cancelled at the last minute. By 1706 he retreated to Aurangabad with the Marathas hovering round, and he died there in 1707 leaving a sorely distracted empire.

As an analytical point, the war was lost not by defeat in the field but by overreach: conquering the Deccan states removed the buffer between the Mughals and the Marathas. For the wider verdict, see Assessment of Aurangzeb’s Reign and the Jagirdari Crisis, and for the Maratha side see Rise of the Marathas – Early Career of Shivaji. The Maratha state that outlived him is described in The Maratha Confederacy in the 18th Century (Peshwas, Bhonsles, Gaikwads, Holkars, Scindias).

Why Is This Topic Important?

• Core of the Mughal decline The Deccan war is central
• Persons and dates Sambhaji, Rajaram, Shahu and the sieges
• Balance Policy mistakes and overreach

What Came Next?

The next topic describes Aurangzeb’s religious policies and the reimposition of jizyah. Next topic: Aurangzeb’s Religious Policies (Reimposition of Jizya).

Key People and Terms

• Madanna and Akkanna Brothers who ran Golconda
• Sardeshmukhi Levy claimed by the Marathas
• Swarajya Maratha-ruled territory
• Shahu Sambhaji’s son
• Rajaram Sambhaji’s brother
• Karnataki foot soldiers Matchlock-armed infantry

Exam Corner

Mains Angle

Questions on Aurangzeb’s Deccan policy ask whether it was a mistake. These points add depth.

• Phases From coercion to conquest
• Mistakes Sambhaji’s execution and overreach
• Costs Demoralised nobles and chauth pacts