Late 1980s Deepening Crisis; 1991 BoP Crisis; Pre-1991 Regulatory Mechanisms and Post-1991 Reforms
Indian Economy › Economic Planning, Economic History and Reforms · Topic 3.12
The 1991 balance of payments crisis was India's worst external payments crisis, when foreign exchange reserves fell to about US$1.1 to 1.2 billion, enough for only two to three weeks of imports, and the country risked default. It followed a decade of rising fiscal deficits and external borrowing in the late 1980s, the Gulf War oil price shock of 1990, falling remittances and political instability. India pledged gold, devalued the rupee by about 18 per cent in two steps on 1 and 3 July 1991, took an IMF stand-by loan of about US$2.2 billion and, under Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, began the reforms of 1991.
7 min read · UPSC Prelims and Mains · Indian Economy · Economic Planning, Economic History and Reforms
At a Glance
- Reserves at the low About US$1.1 to 1.2 billion
- Import cover About three weeks
- Devaluation 1 and 3 July 1991, about 18 per cent in all
- Gold pledged About 67 tonnes in 1991
- IMF stand-by About US$2.2 billion, October 1991
- Exam link UPSC Prelims and Mains, Indian Economy: Economic Planning, Economic History and Reforms
Where Does It Fit?
After the control era in Indian Economy 1947-1991: Types of Economic Systems, Industry and Trade, Trade Policy, Tariffs, Licence-Permit Raj, Classification of Industries into 4 Categories, this topic explains how the model ran into a payments crisis. The reforms that followed are in the next topics. Previous topic: Industrial Policy Resolutions 1948 and 1956; Industries (Development and Regulation) Act 1951; Schedules A and B; Public Sector Monopoly Industries. Next topic: New Economic Policy (NEP): Liberalisation, Privatisation, Globalisation (LPG); Two Primary Strategies of NEP.
What Caused the Late 1980s Crisis and the 1991 BoP Crisis?
| Cause | What happened | Effect |
|---|---|---|
| Rising fiscal deficit | Government spending on subsidies, interest and salaries grew faster than revenue. The combined deficit of the Centre and states was about 9 per cent of GDP in 1990-91 | Heavy borrowing, high interest payments and inflation |
| Current account deficit | Imports of oil, fertiliser and capital goods exceeded exports. The deficit was about 3 per cent of GDP in 1990-91 | Need to finance it by foreign borrowing |
| External debt | Commercial borrowings and short-term credit rose. External debt grew from about US$20.6 billion in 1980-81 to about US$83.8 billion in 1990-91 | High debt service and loss of lender confidence |
| Gulf War of 1990 | Oil prices spiked after Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, and remittances from workers in the Gulf fell | Higher import bill and lower inflows |
| Loss of Soviet trade | Rupee trade with the Soviet Union, a main export market, shrank and then ended | Export earnings dropped |
| Inflation | Inflation rose from about 6.7 per cent in 1989-90 to a peak near 16.7 per cent in 1991 | Eroded competitiveness and household incomes |
| Political instability | Two weak governments in 1989 to 1991 and the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 | Credit ratings were cut and short-term loans were not renewed |
How Did the Pre-1991 Regulatory Mechanisms Differ from Post-1991 Reforms?
| Area | Before 1991 | After 1991 |
|---|---|---|
| Industrial licensing | Licence needed for most industries under the IDRA 1951 | Abolished for all but a short list of industries, 18 in 1991 |
| Public sector | 17 industries reserved for the state | Cut to 8 in 1991 and later to very few |
| Big business | MRTP Act 1969 needed approval for expansion | Asset limit removed and later replaced by the Competition Act 2002 |
| Foreign investment | FERA 1973 with equity usually capped at 40 per cent | Automatic approval for up to 51 per cent in 34 high-priority industries, later raised |
| Imports and tariffs | Import licences, quotas and peak duty near 355 per cent | Licences removed for most goods and tariffs cut in stages |
| Exchange rate | Fixed and administered | Devaluation, then market-determined rate from 1993 |
| Interest rates and banks | Administered rates, high SLR and CRR, directed credit | Deregulated rates and lower reserve ratios after the Narasimham Committee |
| Capital market | Controller of Capital Issues fixed price and timing of issues | SEBI with statutory powers from 1992 |
| Tax system | High and complex rates | Lower rates and a broader base after the Chelliah Committee |
What Else Should You Remember?
- Timeline of the crisis: Reserves were about US$1.2 billion in January 1991 and fell further by June. Narasimha Rao became Prime Minister on 21 June 1991, with Manmohan Singh as Finance Minister
- Gold pledge: In May 1991 about 20 tonnes of gold were pledged to the Union Bank of Switzerland. In July 1991 about 47 tonnes were sent to the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan, raising about US$405 million. In all about 67 tonnes and about US$600 million were raised
- Devaluation: The rupee was devalued by about 9 per cent on 1 July 1991 and by about 11 per cent on 3 July 1991. The aim was to raise exports and cut imports
- IMF support: India had drawn on IMF facilities in January 1991 and then agreed a stand-by arrangement of about US$2.2 billion in October 1991 with conditions on the fiscal deficit and structural reform. The World Bank also gave structural adjustment loans
- Stabilisation and structural adjustment: The response had two parts, short-term stabilisation to cut the deficit and ease the external gap, and long-term structural reforms of industry, trade and finance, as in New Economic Policy (NEP): Liberalisation, Privatisation, Globalisation (LPG); Two Primary Strategies of NEP
- Policy announcements: The Statement on Industrial Policy and the Union Budget were both presented on 24 July 1991. In the budget speech Manmohan Singh quoted Victor Hugo on an idea whose time has come
- Reserves later: Reserves recovered quickly in 1992 and 1993 and have grown to several hundred billion dollars. Reserve adequacy is discussed in Foreign exchange reserves: legal and institutional framework (FEMA 1999); key features and trends; importance and functions
- Was it a crisis of reserves only: No. It was a crisis of the model: a fiscal deficit, controlled trade and weak competitiveness, which is why the reform was structural and not only a loan
- Exchange rate system: Devaluation was followed by the Liberalised Exchange Rate Management System in 1992 and a unified market rate in 1993. For concepts see Devaluation, Revaluation, Appreciation, Depreciation; Interest Rate Differential; Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER), Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER); LERMS; Currency Hedging
- Balance of payments terms: Current account, capital account and reserves are covered in Balance of Payments (BoP): Current Account (Visible/Merchandise, Invisibles: Services, Factor Income, Non-Factor Income, Transfers), Capital Account, Goods and Services Account, Errors and Omissions
- Persons and committees: P. V. Narasimha Rao, Manmohan Singh, Montek Singh Ahluwalia, C. Rangarajan, and later the Narasimham Committee on the financial system and the Chelliah Committee on taxes
- Link with the Mains view: The Mains angle is New Industrial Policy 1991 and persistent challenges of LPG reforms; next generation of reforms
Why Does It Matter for the Exam?
- Numbers: Reserves of about US$1.1 to 1.2 billion, about 18 per cent devaluation on 1 and 3 July 1991, about 67 tonnes of gold
- Causes: Fiscal deficit, current account deficit, Gulf War, falling remittances and political instability
- People: Narasimha Rao as Prime Minister and Manmohan Singh as Finance Minister
- Before and after: Licensing, MRTP, FERA, tariffs and exchange rate moved from control to market
- Common errors: Saying that the IMF loan was needed only because of oil, or confusing devaluation of 1991 with that of 1966
As an analytical point, the crisis showed that a controlled and import-protected economy cannot finance its own growth for long. The reform that followed turned a crisis into an opening, and it is a standard example of crisis-led policy change.
Why Is This Topic Important?
- Causes Asked as a list
- Numbers Reserves, devaluation, gold
- Comparison Before and after 1991
What Came Next?
The next topic explains the New Economic Policy and its LPG strategy. Next topic: New Economic Policy (NEP): Liberalisation, Privatisation, Globalisation (LPG); Two Primary Strategies of NEP.
Key People and Terms
- BoP crisis Inability to pay for imports
- Devaluation Official cut in rupee value
- Stand-by arrangement IMF short-term loan
- Gold pledge Gold as collateral for loans
- Stabilisation Short-term deficit control
- Structural adjustment Long-term reform
Exam Corner
Points to Remember
- Reserves: about US$1.1 to 1.2 billion.
- Devaluation: 1 and 3 July 1991.
- Gold pledged: about 67 tonnes.
- Rao became PM on 21 June 1991.
- Budget and industrial policy: 24 July 1991.
Do Not Confuse With
- Stabilisation and structural adjustment Short-term deficit control versus long-term reform
- Devaluation and depreciation Official cut versus market fall
- 1991 crisis and 1966 devaluation Two different episodes
Memory Hook
Oil up, remittances down, reserves low, gold out, rupee cut, reforms in.
Mains Angle
Questions ask for causes and the response. These points give a structured answer.
- Causes Fiscal, external, political
- Response Gold, devaluation, IMF
- Lesson Reform and discipline
A Question You May Face
An original practice question, not a past paper question.
“What led to the 1991 balance of payments crisis, and how did India respond to it?”
How to Answer
- Causes Deficits, debt, oil shock.
- Crisis Low reserves, rating cuts.
- Response Gold, devaluation, IMF.
- Result LPG reforms.
GS Relevance
Frequently Asked Questions
What was the 1991 balance of payments crisis in India?
It was a severe shortage of foreign exchange in 1991, when reserves fell to about US$1.1 to 1.2 billion, enough for only two to three weeks of imports. India pledged gold, devalued the rupee, took an IMF loan and began far-reaching economic reforms in July 1991.
What were the causes of the 1991 crisis?
The main causes were large fiscal and current account deficits, rising external debt in the 1980s, the 1990 Gulf War oil price shock, a fall in remittances, loss of Soviet trade, inflation and political instability. Together they cut reserves and made lenders unwilling to roll over short-term loans.
How much was the rupee devalued in 1991?
The rupee was devalued in two steps, by about 9 per cent on 1 July 1991 and about 11 per cent on 3 July 1991, which is about 18 per cent in all. The aim was to raise exports, cut imports and rebuild confidence in the external position.
How much gold did India pledge in 1991?
India pledged about 67 tonnes of gold in 1991: about 20 tonnes to the Union Bank of Switzerland in May and about 47 tonnes to the Bank of England and Bank of Japan in July. The July pledge raised about US$405 million, and the total was about US$600 million.
Who led India's economic reforms in 1991?
P. V. Narasimha Rao was Prime Minister from 21 June 1991 and Manmohan Singh was Finance Minister. They presented the Statement on Industrial Policy and the Union Budget on 24 July 1991, which began liberalisation of industry, trade, finance and taxes.
Why is the 1991 crisis important for UPSC?
It is the turning point of Indian economic policy. Prelims asks causes, numbers and persons, and Mains asks the response and its lessons, often as a comparison between pre-1991 regulation and post-1991 reforms in GS Paper 3.
PYQ Practice — Statement Analysis
1 India devalued the rupee in two steps in July 1991.
On 1 and 3 July 1991.
2 The Gulf War of 1990 contributed to the 1991 crisis.
It raised oil prices and cut remittances.
3 Manmohan Singh was Prime Minister in 1991.
He was Finance Minister; Rao was Prime Minister.
4 The IMF loan in 1991 was the first reason for the crisis.
The loan was a response, not a cause.
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