A maritime chokepoint is a narrow, strategically vital sea passage through which a disproportionately large volume of global trade and energy must pass. Any disruption — geopolitical, military, or environmental — immediately ripples into global commodity prices, insurance costs, and supply chains. The word "chokepoint" derives from military strategy: a narrow passage where a small force can "choke off" a much larger flow.
| Term | Meaning | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| Chokepoint | Narrow sea passage with outsized global trade significance | Both Hormuz & Bab-el-Mandeb qualify |
| Strait | Natural narrow waterway connecting two larger bodies of water | Hormuz: Persian Gulf ↔ Gulf of Oman; Bab-el-Mandeb: Red Sea ↔ Gulf of Aden |
| Innocent Passage | Right of foreign ships to pass through territorial sea (≤12 nm) without stopping | UNCLOS Article 19 — can be suspended by coastal state in certain conditions |
| Transit Passage | Non-suspendable right of passage through straits used for international navigation | UNCLOS Articles 37–38 — applies to Hormuz & Bab-el-Mandeb; cannot be legally blocked |
| TSS (Traffic Separation Scheme) | Designated inbound/outbound shipping lanes to prevent collisions in narrow straits | Both Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb use TSS lanes managed under IMO rules |
| Freedom of Navigation (FON) | Right of all nations' ships to traverse international waters and straits | Underpins US/India naval operations when challenged |
| UNCLOS 1982 | UN Convention on Law of the Sea — foundational maritime law treaty | India ratified; Iran is NOT a signatory — critical UPSC distinction |
UNCLOS Part III (Articles 34–45) governs straits used for international navigation. Article 37 defines which straits it applies to; Article 38 grants right of transit passage. Iran, which is NOT a party to UNCLOS, claims it can restrict passage — a position rejected by the international community.
UPSC frequently tests the distinction between Innocent Passage (suspendable, applies to territorial sea broadly) and Transit Passage (non-suspendable, applies specifically to international straits). Hormuz qualifies for Transit Passage — Iran cannot legally close it under UNCLOS.
| Strait | Country | Side | Key Point |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hormuz | Iran | North | Holds Abu Musa & Tunb islands; IRGC naval bases at Bandar Abbas, Bushehr |
| Oman (Musandam exclave) | South | TSS lanes lie in Omani territorial waters — Musandam is an exclave separated from main Oman by UAE territory | |
| UAE | South/West | Coastal access; Sharjah is the emirate closest to Hormuz | |
| Bab-el-Mandeb | Yemen | NE (Asia) | Controls Perim (Mayyun) Island; Houthis control coastal areas; Hodeida port nearby |
| Djibouti | SW (Africa) | Host to French, US, Chinese, Japanese & Indian military bases — most militarised small nation on Earth | |
| Eritrea | SW (Africa) | Dahlak Archipelago lies to north; Assab port on Red Sea coast |
Oman's Musandam Peninsula is a dramatic fjord-carved exclave at the tip of the Arabian Peninsula — it is physically separated from mainland Oman by UAE territory. Inside the UAE, there is also a pocket of Omani territory called Madha (~75 km²) — an enclave within an exclave. The TSS shipping lanes of Hormuz run through Omani territorial waters, not Iranian.
Many students write that Saudi Arabia borders the Strait of Hormuz — this is WRONG. Saudi Arabia has no coastline on the Strait of Hormuz. The strait's southern coast is Oman (Musandam) and UAE only. Saudi Arabia's main ports are on the Red Sea (Jeddah, Yanbu) and the Persian Gulf (Dammam, Jubail) — but it does NOT touch the strait itself.
The name "Bab-el-Mandeb" is Arabic for "Gate of Tears" — referring to the historically treacherous navigation conditions. An Arabic legend says it was named after an earthquake that separated Africa from Arabia, drowning many. In ancient texts it was called "Bab Iskender" (Alexander's Gate) for the eastern channel.
| Chokepoint | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | H1 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strait of Hormuz | 21.9 | 21.8 | 20.7 | 20.9 |
| Bab-el-Mandeb | 8.0 | 9.3 | 4.1 | 4.2 |
| Suez Canal + SUMED | 7.3 | 8.8 | 4.8 | 4.9 |
| Strait of Malacca | 23.0 | 24.0 | 22.5 | 23.2 |
| Cape of Good Hope | 6.1 | 6.2 | 9.3 | 9.1 |
| Panama Canal | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 2.3 |
| Commodity | Hormuz Share | Bab-el-Mandeb Share | Key Exporters |
|---|---|---|---|
| Crude Oil | ~34% of global seaborne crude | ~12% of global seaborne oil | Saudi Arabia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, Iran, Qatar |
| LPG | ~30% of global LPG exports | Significant but secondary | Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar |
| LNG | ~20% of global LNG (Qatar) | Passes after Hormuz → Bab-el-Mandeb for Europe | Qatar (world's top LNG exporter — 112 BCM in 2025) |
| Urea/Fertiliser | ~1/3 of global seaborne fertiliser | Significant agricultural cargo | Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Iran |
| Container Goods | Major Gulf port access (Jebel Ali: 15.5M TEU in 2024) | ~3.3M TEU annually (pre-crisis) | Asia-Europe trade |
| Wheat/Rice | Food security for Gulf states | ~20% global rice; ~15% global wheat exports (pre-2020) | India, Pakistan, Australia (rice); Ukraine, Russia (wheat) |
In 2025, nearly 15 mb/d of crude oil (34% of global crude trade) passed through Hormuz. China and India combined received 44% of those exports. Asia as a whole imported 14.74 million barrels per day of Middle Eastern crude in 2025 — nearly 60% of the region's total purchases.
A dual closure of Hormuz + Bab-el-Mandeb creates a near-complete sea blockade for grain imports to the Gulf and parts of Asia. One-third of global seaborne fertiliser trade transits Hormuz; 46% of global urea trade originates from the region. Urea prices rose 86% from January 2026 following the Hormuz closure — devastating for India (world's largest urea importer).
| Route / Infrastructure | Country | Capacity | Key Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroline (East-West Crude Pipeline / Abqaiq-Yanbu) | Saudi Arabia | Up to 7 mb/d (upgraded 2025); ~2 mb/d in active use (early 2026) | Connects Abqaiq (Eastern Province) to Yanbu (Red Sea). Oil then exits via Bab-el-Mandeb, NOT Hormuz. Spare capacity 3–5 mb/d. |
| ADCO/Habshan–Fujairah Pipeline (UAE) | UAE | ~1.5 mb/d | Connects Abu Dhabi oilfields to Fujairah port on Gulf of Oman — completely bypasses Hormuz |
| Goreh–Jask Pipeline (Iran) | Iran | ~1 mb/d | Opened 2021; allows Iran to export from Jask terminal on Gulf of Oman, bypassing Hormuz. Limited use so far. |
| Iraq (Kirkuk-Ceyhan Pipeline) | Iraq–Turkey | ~0.6 mb/d (disrupted) | Mediterranean route for Iraq's northern crude — bypasses Hormuz but currently disrupted due to disputes |
| Route / Infrastructure | Operator | Capacity | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| SUMED Pipeline (Suez-Mediterranean) | Egypt | ~2.3 mb/d | Connects Ain Sukhna (Red Sea) to Sidi Kerir (Mediterranean) — bypasses Suez Canal but does NOT bypass Bab-el-Mandeb (oil still enters Red Sea through Bab) |
| Suez Canal itself | Egypt | ~4.9 mb/d (oil) + containers | Paired with Bab-el-Mandeb — if Bab is blocked, Suez also effectively blocked for vessels coming from Indian Ocean |
| Cape of Good Hope Route | All shipping | Unlimited (but costly) | Adds 10–14 days and US$1.2–1.8 million in extra fuel costs per round trip. In H1 2025, Cape traffic was 9.1 mb/d (up from 6.0 mb/d in 2023). War-risk insurance premiums rose 1,000%+ from pre-crisis levels (2026). |
Even when Saudi Arabia uses the Petroline to bypass Hormuz, the oil still flows to Yanbu on the Red Sea — and then MUST exit through Bab-el-Mandeb to reach European and Asian markets. So: Petroline bypasses Hormuz but NOT Bab-el-Mandeb. A dual closure of both leaves no viable bypass for most Persian Gulf energy exports. The UAE–Fujairah pipeline is the ONLY route that bypasses Hormuz AND doesn't require Bab-el-Mandeb (Fujairah exports directly to Gulf of Oman).
| Facility | Location | Capacity (MMT) | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Visakhapatnam | Andhra Pradesh | 1.33 MMT | Phase 1 — Operational |
| Mangaluru | Karnataka | 1.50 MMT | Phase 1 — Operational; ADNOC stores 3 MMT extra |
| Padur | Karnataka | 2.50 MMT | Phase 1 — Operational; Phase 2 expansion (+2.5 MMT) planned |
| Chandikhol | Odisha | 4.00 MMT | Phase 2 — Under development (fast-tracked 2026) |
| Phase 1 Total | — | 5.33 MMT | Covers ~9.5 days; currently ~64% filled (~3.37 MMT, March 2026) |
| Phase 2 Total (planned) | — | +6.5 MMT | Target: approach IEA standard of 90 days storage |
| Commodity | % via Hormuz | India's Role Globally | Risk if Disrupted |
|---|---|---|---|
| Crude Oil | ~62% (historical); ~40% post-2026 rerouting | World's 3rd largest oil importer | Inflation, CAD widening, rupee depreciation |
| LPG | ~90% (Petroleum Ministry, March 2026) | Imports ~60% of LPG consumed | Cooking gas shortage, $26.4B import bill pressure |
| Urea/Fertiliser | Majority (via Gulf producers) | World's largest urea importer | Agricultural input shortage; food price inflation |
| LNG | Significant (Qatar is India's key LNG supplier) | Growing LNG importer | Gas supply disruption for power/industry |
| India-Europe Trade | Indirect (via Bab-el-Mandeb + Suez) | EU is India's 2nd largest trade bloc | Shipping time +14 days, +$1.5M/trip cost via Cape |
The IEA standard is 90 days of crude oil storage. India's SPR covers only 9.5 days at full capacity (Phase 1). Combined with commercial stocks, India has ~74 days total — still below the IEA norm. As of March 2026, SPRs were only 64% filled (~5 days effective coverage), raising acute concern during the Hormuz crisis.
Every $10/barrel rise in crude oil increases India's import bill by ~$12–15 billion/year, widens the Current Account Deficit, puts downward pressure on the Rupee, and feeds retail inflation through transport, fertiliser, and input cost channels. Brent crude rose from ~$72 (Feb 2026) to ~$110 (April 2026) — the Hormuz crisis effectively increased India's annual oil import bill by tens of billions of dollars.
| Operation | Launch Date | Area of Operation | Key Features |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operation Sankalp | 19 June 2019 (ongoing) | Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden (extended 2023–24) | "Sankalp" = Sanskrit for "Commitment". Launched after attacks on MV Front Altair & MV Kokuka Courageous. Escorts Indian-flagged merchant vessels. Avg: 16 Indian-flagged vessels escorted/day. Deploys destroyers, frigates (INS Talwar, INS Chennai, INS Kolkata), P-8I Neptune patrol aircraft & Sea Guardian drones. Coordinated by MoD, MEA, MoPNG, Shipping Ministry. |
| Operation Urja Suraksha | 23 March 2026 (ongoing) | Arabian Sea, Strait of Hormuz, Indian Ocean | "Urja Suraksha" = "Energy Protection". Launched specifically in response to 2026 Iran War disruption. Escorts Indian-flagged ships AND ships destined for Indian ports transiting Hormuz. First activation since 2019 of full energy-security escort mandate. |
Announced at G20 New Delhi 2023; endorsed by US President Trump in February 2025. Connects Indian ports → Gulf states (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan) → Israel → Europe. Explicit energy infrastructure pillar linking Indian ports to European markets via overland pipelines and rail, bypassing maritime chokepoints. Backed by India, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan, Israel, EU.
Connects India → Iran → Central Asia → Russia. A multimodal (ship + rail + road) corridor. India invested in Chabahar Port (Iran, on Gulf of Oman) as a key node — this port is outside the Hormuz strait and gives India strategic access to Afghanistan and Central Asia without going through Pakistan.
India rerouted roughly 70% of crude imports away from Hormuz (up from 55%) by March 2026. Sources used: Russian crude (discounted, via US waivers), Latin America, West Africa, Saudi Yanbu port (via Red Sea/Cape of Good Hope), UAE Fujairah. India's first VLCC terminal at Mundra Port (launched January 2026) enhances capacity to receive non-Hormuz supplies.
On 26 March 2026, Iranian FM Abbas Araghchi announced that vessels from 5 nations — China, Russia, India, Iraq, and Pakistan — would be permitted to transit the Strait of Hormuz. India's diplomatic relations with Iran (and non-alignment in the US-Israel-Iran conflict) directly secured this exemption — a unique geopolitical benefit of India's "strategic autonomy" doctrine.
UPSC frequently asks about Operation Sankalp — its launch date (19 June 2019), the Sanskrit meaning ("Commitment"), the triggering incident (tanker attacks in Gulf of Oman), and its scope (Hormuz + Gulf of Aden). Also: Chabahar Port and INSTC are standard Prelims/Mains linkages for this topic.
| Chokepoint | Connects | Oil Flow (mb/d, H1 2025) | Share Global Maritime Trade | India Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strait of Malacca | Indian Ocean ↔ South China Sea (Pacific) | 23.2 | ~20% by value (highest globally) | India's eastern trade; critical for China–India rivalry |
| Strait of Hormuz | Persian Gulf ↔ Gulf of Oman | 20.9 | ~25% seaborne oil | Most critical for India — 62% crude, 90% LPG |
| Suez Canal + SUMED | Red Sea ↔ Mediterranean | 4.9 | ~15% by value | India–Europe trade; Indian textile, pharma exports |
| Bab-el-Mandeb | Red Sea ↔ Gulf of Aden | 4.2 | ~8.7% by value; ~14% overall | India–Europe gateway; Suez Canal feeder from Indian Ocean side |
| Danish Straits | Baltic Sea ↔ North Sea | 4.9 | ~5–7% | Russian oil exports; limited India relevance |
| Turkish Straits (Bosporus) | Black Sea ↔ Mediterranean | 3.7 | ~4–5% | Russia/Caspian oil; limited India relevance |
| Panama Canal | Pacific ↔ Atlantic | 2.3 | ~3% by value | India's trade with US East Coast and Latin America |
Strait of Malacca handles the highest volume of maritime trade by value (~20%) and vessel count. However, Strait of Hormuz is uniquely critical for energy security — it is the ONLY maritime exit from the Persian Gulf, making it irreplaceable. Malacca has no such exclusive geographical position. Hormuz = no alternative. Malacca = Singapore Strait and Lombok/Sunda Straits as alternatives (albeit longer).
| Factor | Hormuz | Bab-el-Mandeb | Malacca |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bypass feasibility | Limited (Petroline, UAE pipeline) | None practical (only Cape of Good Hope) | Yes (Lombok/Sunda/Singapore Straits) |
| Primary risk actor | Iran (IRGC); mines, missile threat | Yemen Houthis; Iranian proxies | Piracy, territorial disputes (China) |
| India's dependency | CRITICAL — energy imports | HIGH — Europe trade + feeder to Suez | HIGH — East Asia trade; China imports |
| UNCLOS applicability | Iran not party; disputed | Yemen/Djibouti are parties; contested in practice | Malaysia/Indonesia/Singapore — all parties |
| Military presence | US Navy, Indian Navy, Iranian IRGC | US (Djibouti), France, China, Japan, India | US Navy, Singapore Navy, ReCAAP anti-piracy |
Djibouti (population ~1.1 million; area 23,200 km²) bordering Bab-el-Mandeb hosts military bases of: USA (Camp Lemonnier — only permanent US base in Africa), France (oldest foreign French base), China (China's first overseas military base, est. 2017), Japan, and Italy. This makes it the most strategically militarised small nation relative to size — its entire economy is structured around strategic hosting.
2026 Hormuz Crisis (28 Feb 2026 — Ongoing): Following US–Israeli airstrikes against Iran that began 28 February 2026, Iran announced closure of the Strait of Hormuz to "unfriendly nations." The IRGC issued VHF warnings, boarded and attacked merchant ships, and laid sea mines. Shipping traffic dropped to ~5% of pre-conflict levels. At least 18 vessels were attacked, 1 tugboat sunk, 2 merchant ships captured, 12 seafarers killed/missing. Brent crude rose from ~$72 (Feb 27) to ~$110 by end-April 2026. A Persian Gulf Strait Authority was formed under US pressure. US–Iran ceasefire is fragile as of June 2026.
Dual Chokepoint Risk Quantified: A combined Hormuz + Bab-el-Mandeb disruption places an estimated $10 billion per day of global trade at risk. Maersk, CMA CGM, and Hapag-Lloyd began rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope (March 2026), with war-risk insurance premiums soaring more than 1,000%. Cape of Good Hope routing adds US$1.2–1.8 million per round trip in fuel costs. Urea prices rose 86% from January 2026 — India (world's largest urea importer) and Brazil are most severely affected.
India's Diplomatic Exemption (26 March 2026): Iranian FM Abbas Araghchi announced that vessels from China, Russia, India, Iraq, and Pakistan would be permitted to transit Hormuz — reflecting their non-hostile stance toward Iran. India rerouted roughly 70% of crude imports away from Hormuz (up from 55%), absorbing discounted Russian crude via US waivers. India's new VLCC terminal at Mundra Port launched January 2026 to handle non-Hormuz supply at scale.
India's SPR Crisis: As of March 2026, India's SPRs held only about 64% of capacity (~3.37 MMT) — providing approximately 5 days of crude coverage. Government fast-tracked Phase 2 SPR expansion of 6.5 MMT, including a new 4 MMT underground facility at Chandikhol (Odisha) and a 2.5 MMT expansion at Padur (Karnataka). ISPRL also exploring overseas storage in Oman. India's petroleum ministry confirmed in March 2026 that ~60% of LPG consumption is imported, and ~90% of those imports flow through Hormuz, creating acute domestic fuel security concern.
Bab-el-Mandeb Threat Escalates: As of June 2026, Iran has threatened to extend disruptions to Bab-el-Mandeb. Iranian adviser Ali Akbar Velayati warned the resistance axis "can shut down both Bab al-Mandab and Hormuz." Iran's Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf queried publicly on April 3: "What share of global oil, LNG, wheat, rice and fertiliser transits Bab-el-Mandeb?" — seen as signalling intent. The Houthis, who resume attacks as of March 28 (after US–Iranian war reignited), declared the Bab-el-Mandeb "completely closed to the Israeli enemy." Shipping through the Red Sea remains ~60% below 2023 levels (after October 2025 ceasefire only partially restored traffic).
Energy Data Highlights: In 2025, nearly 15 mb/d of crude (34% of global crude trade) passed through Hormuz; China and India combined received 44%. Qatar exported over 112 billion cubic metres of LNG in 2025 (world's top LNG exporter) — virtually all via Hormuz. The IEA estimated that 4.2 mb/d of crude oil and petroleum liquids transited Bab-el-Mandeb in H1 2025 (down from 9.3 mb/d in 2023 due to Houthi attacks). India spends USD 26.4 billion/year importing cooking gas (LPG) alone, most shipped through Hormuz. India's strategic reserves cover only about 25 days of crude oil and LPG combined (10 days for LNG) — far below the IEA 90-day standard.
The 2026 Hormuz crisis is the most significant real-world test of chokepoint theory in decades and is very high probability for UPSC Prelims 2026 current affairs questions. Expect questions on: (1) which nations Iran permitted to transit; (2) Operation Urja Suraksha launch date; (3) India's SPR capacity and locations; (4) the Petroline/Yanbu bypass; (5) Brent crude impact. The dual Hormuz + Bab-el-Mandeb scenario and its "no bypass" character is a top Mains angle.
| Statement | T/F | Reason / Correction |
|---|---|---|
| The Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman. | ✅ TRUE | It is the sole maritime exit from the Persian Gulf to the open ocean (→ Arabian Sea) |
| Saudi Arabia lies on the southern coast of the Strait of Hormuz. | ❌ FALSE | Southern coast = Oman (Musandam exclave) + UAE. Saudi Arabia has NO coastline on the strait. |
| The Bab-el-Mandeb Strait connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. | ✅ TRUE | Located between Yemen (NE) and Djibouti + Eritrea (SW). "Gate of Tears" in Arabic. |
| Perim Island in Bab-el-Mandeb belongs to Djibouti. | ❌ FALSE | Perim (Mayyun) Island belongs to Yemen. It lies off Yemen's southwestern coast and divides the strait into two channels. |
| The Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) in the Strait of Hormuz lies in Iranian territorial waters. | ❌ FALSE | The TSS lanes lie in Omani territorial waters, north of the Musandam Peninsula. |
| Under UNCLOS, the right of transit passage through international straits can be suspended by the coastal state. | ❌ FALSE | Transit passage (Articles 37–38) is non-suspendable. This is precisely why Iran's 2026 closure was legally contested. |
| Iran is a signatory to UNCLOS. | ❌ FALSE | Iran has NOT ratified UNCLOS — this is why it disputes transit passage rights in Hormuz. |
| Operation Sankalp was launched in 2019 to protect Indian merchant vessels in the Strait of Malacca. | ❌ FALSE | Operation Sankalp targets the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and Persian Gulf — not Malacca. Launched 19 June 2019. |
| Musandam Peninsula of Oman is contiguous with mainland Oman. | ❌ FALSE | Musandam is an exclave of Oman — it is physically separated from mainland Oman by UAE territory. |
| Qatar can completely bypass the Strait of Hormuz to export its LNG. | ❌ FALSE | Qatar has no pipeline bypass. All Qatari LNG exits via Hormuz. Qatar's Ras Laffan LNG terminal is entirely dependent on Hormuz passage. |
The single most common error: writing Saudi Arabia as a bordering country of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia does NOT border the Strait of Hormuz. The southern coast = Oman (Musandam) + UAE. Saudi Arabia's Red Sea and Persian Gulf coast are entirely separate from the strait.
Frequently confused in pair-matching questions. Memory trick: Hormuz = Half-Moon (Persian Gulf shaped like a half-moon) connects to Gulf of Oman. Bab-el-Mandeb = Bottom of Red Sea (it's at the southern end of the Red Sea) connects to Gulf of Aden.
The western channel (26 km wide, deep) is used by large commercial vessels. The eastern channel (only ~3 km wide) is shallow and used only for local traffic. UPSC sometimes reverses this. The island that separates them is Perim (Mayyun) — a Yemeni volcanic island.
Questions ask which countries have military bases in Djibouti. The correct list includes: USA, France, China, Japan, Italy (and India has logistics access). China's base (opened 2017) was its FIRST overseas military base. This is a classic Prelims trap where students undercount or miscredit the nations present.
Students often state that Saudi Arabia's Petroline allows it to "bypass" all chokepoints. This is partially wrong. Petroline takes oil to Yanbu on the Red Sea — but oil still has to exit via Bab-el-Mandeb to reach global markets. Only the UAE's Habshan–Fujairah pipeline truly bypasses Hormuz AND exits directly to the Gulf of Oman, avoiding Bab-el-Mandeb entirely.
UPSC loves pair-matching questions: "Strait — Waters it connects." Always memorise: Hormuz = Persian Gulf ↔ Gulf of Oman | Bab-el-Mandeb = Red Sea ↔ Gulf of Aden | Malacca = Andaman Sea (Indian Ocean) ↔ South China Sea | Gibraltar = Atlantic ↔ Mediterranean | Palk Strait = Bay of Bengal ↔ Gulf of Mannar.
| Parameter | Strait of Hormuz | Bab-el-Mandeb |
|---|---|---|
| Arabic Meaning | "Hormuz" = from Kingdom of Hormuz (13th–17th c.) | "Gate of Tears" |
| Connects | Persian Gulf ↔ Gulf of Oman | Red Sea ↔ Gulf of Aden |
| Width (min) | ~33–39 km | ~32 km (overall); western channel 26 km |
| Bordering (N/NE) | Iran | Yemen |
| Bordering (S/SW) | Oman (Musandam exclave) + UAE | Djibouti + Eritrea |
| Key Island | Abu Musa; Greater/Lesser Tunb (Iran-UAE dispute) | Perim (Mayyun) — belongs to Yemen |
| Oil flow (H1 2025) | 20.9 mb/d | 4.2 mb/d |
| Primary threat actor | Iran (IRGC) | Houthis (Yemen) / Iran proxies |
| Bypass option | Petroline (Saudi), UAE pipeline | None (except Cape of Good Hope) |
| India operation | Op Sankalp (2019) + Op Urja Suraksha (2026) | Op Sankalp extended 2023–24 |
| UNCLOS status | Iran ≠ signatory; disputed | All 3 coastal states are parties |